the embryos in question. This paper examines two well-known disputes over frozen embryos and three types of ethical This opinion was previously published on Webtrack 94, arguments used to assign dispositional authority over embryos. November 19, 1999 The conflict arising in Victoria is examined in the light of At what stage is consent for the use of donated gametes these ethical frameworks. irrevocable? This question can be understood in two different ways, as a legal question, at what stage is consent for the use Disputes over frozen embryos of donated gametes legally irrevocable and as an ethical question, when, if at all, is it morally wrong to withdraw
The case of a sperm donor objecting to the transfer of embryos consent? Arguably, moral questions are always open to interformed from his donation can be likened to disputes over pretation, however, until recently in Victoria, Australia, so too frozen embryos, where the sperm provider and the egg provider was the legal question. This article addresses both questions disagree over what should be the fate of their frozen embryos. with reference to the current legislation in Victoria and in the Two such well-known disputes, fought in the US courts, light of a recent instance of a sperm donor in Victoria who serve to illustrate attempts to arbitrate conflicting claims over sought to withdraw consent after embryos had been formed embryos. from his donation. This case is used to highlight the difficulties In the case of Davis v Davis (discussed in Annas, 1989 ; with the legislation in Victoria and the ethical issues that Robertson, 1989; Colker, 1996) , the custody of seven frozen underlie attempts to resolve competing claims over gametes embryos was contested in a divorce action. In a highly and embryos.
controversial decision the trial judge ruled that the embryos Reproductive technology in Victoria is governed by the were 'children in vitro', and awarded custody to Mrs Davis Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (the Act). This legislation (Davis v Davis, 1990) . According to this decision, survival is incorporates an amended version of the 1984 (Medical Procedin the best interests of embryos and therefore the wishes of ures) Act, the world's first legislation on in-vitro fertilization the party desiring to reproduce prevail. On appeal this decision (IVF). With regard to the present discussion, the relevant was later reversed. The judgement of the court of appeals amendments to the Act include the provision for persons born (Davis v Davis, 1992) was that even though embryos have from donated gametes, on turning 18 years of age, to seek been accorded more respect than mere human cells they are information which will or may identify the donor. Along with not given legal status equivalent to that of persons already the new statute, a new statutory body was established, the born. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the party Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA), to administer infertility wanting to avoid reproduction should control disposition of services in Victoria, Australia. Following an objection from a the embryos, unless the other party has no other reasonable sperm donor to the use of embryos formed from his spermatoway of reproducing without the embryos in question. This zoa, the clinic storing the embryos in question sought clarificadecision relied on an understanding of a woman's right to tion from the ITA, of the Act's provisions for withdrawal of terminate a pregnancy as conferring on men the right not to consent. The Act allows that gamete donors can withdraw become a parent. consent before a procedure is carried out, however it is not
In a similar divorce hearing in New York (Kass v Kass, clear to which procedure this refers (Infertility Treatment Act, 1998 , discussed in Colker 1996 Annas, 1998) , Maureen Kass 1995) . On one reading of the Act it could be understood that attempted to gain sole custody of frozen embryos remaining a gamete donor can withdraw consent at any time prior to the after 10 unsuccessful IVF procedures. Her husband Steven transfer of embryos. However, another interpretation would Kass opposed her request. The Kass's had signed a prior allow gamete donors to withdraw consent only for the use of agreement stating that in the event that they no longer wished their gametes, that is, until the time of fertilization. Given this to initiate a pregnancy or were unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of their stored embryos, they approved of their disposal for research. The trial court awarded the frozen embryos to the ex-wife arguing that because it is the woman who is more directly affected by the pregnancy the right to abortion is implied from her right to privacy or to control her own body. Abortion rights are generally enacted balance weighs in her favour. The Kass court concluded based on abortion laws, that a woman has the exclusive right to to protect bodily autonomy. As argued by Colker (1996) and Robertson (1989) , laws permitting abortion are not relevant to determine the fate of an embryo even when that embryo lies outside her body. This decision was appealed and New York's extracorporeal embryos and cannot be taken to mean that women have exclusive rights in deciding the fate of embryos highest court affirmed that the couple's prior agreement to donate the embryos to research should be enforced.
lying outside their bodies. Reproductive rights can be implied from laws which protect against bodily intrusion, such as laws which ensure that Resolving disputes over frozen embryos gametes cannot be forcibly removed or that women cannot be forced to terminate or continue gestating their pregnancies. The above cases serve to illustrate three types of arguments brought to bear in attempting to resolve disputes over frozen
The freedom or right to become a parent does not relate to or help clarify who has dispositional authority over embryos. embryos: arguments which make the rights of embryos, donors, or recipients overriding; arguments which arbitrate on the basis Similarly, reproductive freedom does not entail that a desire to avoid reproduction gives gamete donors claims over embryos of who incurs the greatest burdens and arguments for enforcing prior agreements. Each of these arguments will be considered already transferred and implanted. Attempts to force woman to terminate pregnancies or to in turn. prevent women from seeking abortions have consistently failed, reflecting the legal right of women to decide the fate of their Protecting embryos pregnancies (e.g. Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 1976) . This legal right illustrates a deeply held conviction that a woman's In the Kass case, the trial judge attempted to resolve the dispute over the frozen embryos with reference to the moral bodily autonomy is overriding despite the wishes of other parties contributing to the pregnancy. The importance given status of embryos and their interest in continued existence. However, claims about the moral worth of embryos do not to individual bodily autonomy entails that gamete donors cannot withdraw consent for the use of embryos formed form help resolve disputes over embryos. For the sake of argument, if, as is the case in Victoria, the recipients had learned of the their donations after such embryos have been transferred. sperm donors' later objection and decided that they no longer wished to use the embryos in question, there would have been Who is most harmed? no opposition to a request to discard the embryos. In Victoria, as in many other jurisdictions, couples can discard their According to the above analysis, with regard to frozen embryos, reproductive rights are not absolute. Competing claims such embryos, at any time, simply by fulfilling the requirements for mutual written consent. Thus even if there is a prevailing as, the desire to reproduce versus the desire not to, cannot be arbitrated without regard to the consequences of ruling one disposition to preserve or protect embryos, it is already legally permissible that where both gamete providers agree, their way or another. In the Davis case the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the party wanting to avoid reproduction should embryos can be discarded. This entails that it is not the moral status of the embryo that in current IVF practice and legislature control the fate of the embryos, unless the other party has no other reasonable way of reproducing without the embryos in determines its fate, but the wishes of the persons who created the embryo. Even if we accept that embryos should be question. Similarly legal theorist, Robertson (1989) argues that the wishes of the party avoiding reproduction should prevail preserved, we also accept that the couple's wishes are overriding and therefore that it is not true that an embryo's existence because the burdens of unwanted reproduction outweigh the burdens of non-transfer. According to Robertson, a person should always be preserved. Therefore, if the moral status of the embryo is not overriding it cannot be used to arbitrate who objects to the uterine transfer of embryos from his or her gametes may experience significant 'psychosocial burdens' if disputes between those wishing to reproduce and those wishing to avoid reproduction.
these embryos lead to offspring, even if no child supporting obligations are incurred (as is the case for gamete donors in Victoria). He cites the example of a failed marriage '...that Protecting reproductive autonomy would have produced biological offspring, for which the unconsenting partner may have strong feeling of attachment, With regard to reproductive rights, the Kass and Davis cases also illustrate attempts to answer the question 'Does the desire responsibility, guilt etc.' (Robertson, 1989) . He adds that if embryo transfer and birth occur, this partner is irreversibly or right to reproduce override the desire or right not to reproduce?' However, the answer to this question does not harmed because the burdens of unwanted parenthood cannot be avoided. However, without empirical studies on the connecessarily resolve disputes over frozen embryos either.
In the Davis case parallels were made between a woman's sequences of unwanted parenthood for gamete donors, it is difficult to equate the burdens of unwanted parenthood for right to abortion and a man's right not to have children. It was argued that a woman's right to decide the fate of her pregnancy them with those of estranged partners, or donors who do incur duties towards their offspring. There are studies suggesting implies her right of veto over embryos. But in Victoria a woman's right to abortion is based on her right to protect her that gamete donors do not construe their donation as parenthood (Cook and Golombok, 1995; Daniels et al., 1996) and one mental and physical health. Similarly in the US, a woman's study from Western Australia suggests that many gamete not require that divorcing mothers always receive custody of children'. donors see their donation as equivalent to donating blood Obviously the burden associated with embryo transfer or (Walker and Broderick, 1999) . However, it is not known to non-transfer when sperm providers and egg providers disagree, what extent gamete donors who cannot remain anonymous will vary from case to case and for different donors and construe their donation as parenthood, nor if the burdens recipients. Decisions about the dispositional authority over associated with unwanted parenthood would be greater for embryos based on the burdens or harm done, to either the these donors than for anonymous gamete donors. In any event, gamete donor or recipients, are difficult to justify when the even if we acknowledge a significant burden associated with extent to which these harms will manifest is unpredictable. If unwanted offspring for gamete donors, it is not clear that this the extent of the burdens incurred varies between individual would be significant for all donors, nor that such burdens cases, it may be that conflicting claims on embryos should be would always be greater than the burdens of non-transfer. decided on a case by case basis. With regard to the burdens of non-transfer, there are many accounts from IVF patients on the anguish associated with failed cycles (Salzer, 1991; Bialosky and Schulman, 1998) .
Advance directives That there are burdens associated with non-transfer of embryos, Attempts to ensure advance directives for the disposition of where this is desired by one of the parties, can be taken for embryos reflect a desire to avoid just such case by case granted. However, as Robertson (1989) argues, frustrating this arbitration. In the Kass case the court held that an agreement desire in the case of particular embryos will not in most made between the parties prior to the commencement of IVF instances prevent a couple from trying again. As long as the procedures should be carried out. Indeed some commentators party wishing to reproduce could, without undue burden, create have suggested that the best way to avoid disputes over other embryos, the desire to avoid offspring, he reasons, should gametes and embryos is for IVF clinics to require advance take priority over the desire to reproduce with the embryos in directives and for courts to consider them legally binding question. (Roberstson 1989 ,1996 , Pennings 1997 ). This reasoning is complicated by the fact that there could Although this may prove to be a legally expedient rule it be many recipient couples involved for any one gamete donor.
does not help to resolve issues where no explicit agreement Thus the harms attributable to non-transfer are magnified was made or where the party is requesting the legal right to according to the number of embryos and recipient couples break the contract. Moreover, as Annas (1998) and Capron involved. However, it is unlikely that the burdens of unwanted (1992) argue, agreements involving personal relationships are offspring would be equally magnified for gamete donors, not equivalent to contracts involving property. We already because Ͻ30% of embryo transfers result in live births.
accept that contracts made involving personal human relationMoreover, very few recipients of donor spermatozoa currently ships can be broken, as exemplified by divorce, custody reveal, or plan to tell this fact to the resultant offspring (Klock disputes and more recently surrogacy contracts (discussed in and Maier, 1991; Walker and Broderick, 1999) . Further, since Robertson, 1994) . In these cases legal disputes are not settled the creation of future embryos cannot be guaranteed, even if solely with reference to prior agreements, the current interests the recipient couple were prepared to undergo a further IVF of the parties involved and changes in their life's circumstances cycle, it could be that the loss of the embryos in question are given due consideration. would indeed amount to an irreversible loss. With regard to Legal issues aside, there are ethical arguments, which may creating further embryos without undue burden, there are many make prior agreements morally binding. that would argue that each cycle of IVF imposes very great emotional, physical and financial burdens with serious associated risks. A non-transfer cycle will for many couples reduce Consenting as promising their reproductive potential and for some it could make their It could be argued that an agreement to donate gametes is best infertility irreversible.
characterized as an act of promising (Pennings, 1997) rather It has been argued, with regard to the custody of embryos, than of giving informed consent. Promising can be distinguthat sperm donation and egg donation are disanalogous because ished from consenting by the lack of obligation attached to egg donation involves significantly more discomfort and risk consenting (Gillam, 1994) . Informed consent as normally than does sperm donation (Annas, 1998). The fact that there understood implies the right to withdraw consent. For example, may be more harm associated with egg retrieval than sperm if a person consents to taking part in a research project retrieval might support an egg providers claims over embryos this does not imply any continuing obligation. The right to for her own fertility treatment, on the basis that she incurs withdraw consent and to cease to take part in the project is greater burdens than the sperm provider, in creating further uncontroversial. But, in the case of gamete donation, the donor embryos. However, with regard to withdrawal of consent to is promising to become a parent (of sorts) and the donor's the use of embryos formed from egg donations, if an egg undertaking creates expectations on the part of the recipient donor intends to veto embryo transfer to a recipient, the risks couple. That is, gamete donors put themselves under certain and harms associated with egg donation do not automatically obligations, as is the case when making a promise and the entail that an egg donors wishes are overriding. As Robertson recipient couple act on the assumption that the promise will be kept (Robertson, 1989) . (1989, p.7) argues 'Great differences in physical burdens do Given that donating spermatozoa or eggs can be equated can withdraw consent to the use of their gametes when no great reliance is placed on their particular donation. However, with making a promise, are there instances where this promise can justifiably be broken? It has been suggested that a promise the degree of reliance placed on gamete donors to keep their promises once embryos are formed, makes it in general morally only creates an obligation if the promise actually places reliance on the promisee (Bronaugh, 1992 (ITA, 1999) . The reasoning behind this change remains to date absolute, when a strong reliance is placed on the donor keeping the promise then a later mere unwillingness to do so would unpublished. The matter was not fought in the courts and no action followed ITA's communication of a revised interpretation not normally justify breaking it. It has been claimed that gamete donors should have the right to change their minds of the Act. In the planning of legislation it is important that, if gamete because they cannot predict how they may later feel about passing on their genes. But this is precisely the risk that is donors are to be legally bound by their prior agreements or promises, then they and all concerned must be clear on what taken in promising to anything where the actual outcomes are unknown. The fact that there is some unpredictability it is that is being promised. associated with gamete donation, such as uncertainty about future emotional responses or life circumstances does not automatically entail that all such promises can thereforearbitrate competing claims over frozen embryos. On this Capron, A.M. (1992) Parenthood and frozen embryos more than property and analysis, respect for bodily autonomy entails that gamete privacy. Hastings Cent. Rep., Sept/Oct, [32] [33] donors cannot withdraw consent for the use of embryos formed Colker, R. (1996) izing gamete donation as an act of promising, gamete donors
